ㅇ Content
1. Introduction
ㅡ America's Historic Ties to the Indo-Pacific
ㅡ Vision and Principle for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific
2. Indo-Pacific Stategic Landspace : Trends and Challanges
1) The People's Republic of China as a Revisionist Power
2) Russia as a Revitalized Malign Actor
3) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a Rogue state
4) Prevalence of Transnational Challanges
3. U.S. National Interests and Defense Strategy
4. Sustaining U.S Influence to Achieve Regional Objectives
1) Line of Effort 1 : Preparedness
2) Line of Effort 2 : Partnership
3) Line of Effort 3 : Promoting a Networked Region
5. Conclusion
1. Introduction
ㅡ The Indo-Pacific is the single most consequential region for America’s future.
Spanning a vast stretch of the globe from the west coast of the United States to the western shores of India,
the region is home to the world’s most populous state, most populous democracy, and largest Muslim-majority state, and includes over half of the earth’s population.
Among the 10 largest standing armies in the world, 7 reside in the Indo-Pacific; and 6 countries in the region possess nuclear weapons. Nine of the world’s 10 busiest seaports are in the region, and 60 percent of global maritime trade transits through Asia, with roughly one-third of global shipping passing through the South China Sea alone.
ㅡ The Indo-Pacific contributes two-thirds of global growth in gross domestic product (GDP)
and accounts for 60 percent of global GDP.
This region includes the world’s largest economies – the United States, China, and Japan – and six of the world’s fastest growing economies – India, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Nepal, and the Philippines.
A quarter of U.S. exports go to the Indo-Pacific,
and exports to China and India have more than doubled over the past decade.
This is made possible by free and open trade routes through the air, sea, land, space,
and cyber commons that form the current global system
1.2 Vision and Principles for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific
1) Respect for sovereignty and independence of all nations;
2) Peaceful resolution of disputes;
3) Free, fair, and reciprocal trade based on open investment, transparent agreements, and connectivity;
4) Adherence to international rules and norms, including those of freedom of navigation and overflight
ㅡ A free and open Indo-Pacific rests on a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability
ㅡ As the region grows in population and economic weight, U.S. strategy will adapt to ensure
that the Indo-Pacific is increasingly a place of peace, stability, and growing prosperity – and not one of disorder, conflict, and predatory economics.
Embedding these free and open principles will require efforts across the spectrum of our agencies and capabilities:
diplomatic initiatives, governance capacity building, economic cooperation and commercial advocacy, and military cooperation.
2. Indo-Pacific Stategic Landspace : Trends and Challanges
1) The People's Republic of China as a Revisionist Power
ㅡChina’s economic, political, and military rise is one of the defining elements of the 21st century.
Today, the Indo-Pacific increasingly is confronted with a more confident and assertive China
that is willing to accept friction in the pursuit of a more expansive set of political, economic, and security interests
ㅡ Perhaps no country has benefited more from the free and open regional and international system than China,
which has witnessed the rise of hundreds of millions from poverty to growing prosperity and security
With more than half of the world’s Muslim population living in the Indo-Pacific, the region views the PRC’s systematic mistreatment of Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims in Xinjiang – including pervasive discrimination, mass detention, and disappearances – with deep concern. China’s violation of international norms also extends abroad
ㅡ Chinese nationals acting in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security were recently indicted for
conducting global campaigns of cyber theft that targeted intellectual property and confidential business and
technological information at managed service providers. China has continued to militarize the South China Sea
by placing anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles on the disputed Spratly Islands
and employing paramilitary forces in maritime disputes vis-à-vis other claimants.
In the air, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increased patrols around and near Taiwan using bomber, fighter,
and surveillance aircraft to signal Taiwan. China additionally employs non-military tools coercively,
including economic tools, during periods of political tensions with countries that China accuses of harming its national interests.
ㅡAs China continues its economic and military ascendance, it seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and, ultimately global preeminence in the long-term.
China is investing in a broad range of military programs and weapons, including those designed to
improve power projection; modernize its nuclear forces; and conduct increasingly complex operations in domains such as cyberspace, space, and electronic warfare operations.
China is also developing a wide array of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities,
which could be used to prevent countries from operating in areas near China’s periphery,
including the maritime and air domains that are open to use by all countries.
ㅡ Simultaneously, China is engaged in a campaign of low-level coercion to assert control of
disputed spaces in the region, particularly in the maritime domain.
China is using a steady progression of small, incremental steps in the “gray zone” between peaceful relations
and overt hostilities to secure its aims, while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict.
Such activities can involve the coordination of multiple tools, including: political warfare, disinformation,
use of A2/AD networks, subversion, and economic leverage
ㅡ A lack of transparency also clouds China’s activities in the polar regions.
In 2018, China announced the inclusion of the region in One Belt One Road as the “Polar Silk Road”
and emphasized its self-declared status as a “Near-Arctic State.”
China is also expanding its engagement and capabilities in the Antarctic,
in particular by working to finalize a fifth research station, which will diversify its presence across the continent
2) Russia as a Revitalized Malign Actor
ㅡ Russia’s interest and influence in the region continue to increase through national outreach and
military modernization – in both its conventional forces and strategic forces.
Despite slow economic growth due to Western sanctions and decreasing oil prices,
Russia continues to modernize its military and prioritize strategic capabilities – including its nuclear forces, A2/AD systems, and expanded training for long-range aviation
– in an attempt to re-establish its presence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Russia’s operations and engagement throughout this region are consistent with its global influence activities,
which seek to advance Moscow’s strategic interests while undermining U.S. leadership and the
rules-based international order
ㅡ Russia is re-establishing its military presence in the Indo-Pacific by regularly flying bomber and
reconnaissance missions in the Sea of Japan and conducting operations as far east as Alaska and
the west coast of the continental United States. Russia has also intensified its diplomatic outreach
in Southeast Asia, seeking to capitalize on U.S.-China tensions in order to present itself as a neutral “third partner.”
The Russian Navy has increased its operations and reach, with the Russian Pacific Fleet deploying ships to support
operations in the Middle East and Europe, and the Russian Baltic and Black Sea Fleets deploying to the Indo-Pacific. Russian ballistic missile and attack submarines remain active in the region,
while Russia is also undertaking efforts to modernize its conventional forces and nuclear strike capabilities.
3) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a Rogue state
ㅡ The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) will remain a security challenge for DoD,
the global system, our allies and partners, and competitors, until we achieve the final, fully verifiable denuclearization
as committed to by Chairman Kim Jong Un.
Although a pathway to peace is open for a diplomatic resolution of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program,
other weapons of mass destruction, missile threats, and the security challenges North Korea presents are real and
demand continued vigilance. North Korea’s history as a serial proliferator, including conventional arms, nuclear technology, ballistic missiles, and chemical agents to countries, such as Iran and Syria, adds to our security concerns.
Furthermore, the DPRK’s continued human rights violations and abuse against its own people, including violations of individuals’ freedom of expression, remain an issue of deep concern to the international community. The United States also continues to support Japan's position that North Korea must completely resolve the issue of Japanese abductees, and has raised this with North Korean authorities.
ㅡ North Korea has developed an intercontinental ballistic missile intended to be capable of striking the continental United States with a nuclear or conventional payload.
In 2017, North Korea conducted a series of increasingly complex ballistic missile launches eastward toward the United States. North Korea did so by overflying Japan with long-range ballistic missiles. Some tests were done at highly lofted trajectories designed to simulate flights at ranges that could reach the United States.
ㅡ North Korea poses a conventional threat to U.S. allies, such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan.
North Korea has long-range artillery arrayed against the ROK – particularly the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area – capable of inflicting catastrophic damage on ROK civilians and large numbers of U.S. citizens.
North Korea has demonstrated willingness to use lethal force to achieve its ends.
In 2010, North Korea sank the ROK corvette CHEONAN and killed 46 sailors in an unprovoked attack.
In 2010, it also shelled the ROK Yeonpyeong Island in the Yellow Sea, killing 2 civilians and 2 military personnel and wounding 22 more.
ㅡ North Korea continues to circumvent international sanctions and the U.S.-led pressure campaign through diplomatic engagement, counter pressure against the sanctions regime, and direct sanctions evasion.
Early in 2018, North Korea exceeded its sanctioned limit on refined petroleum imports through illicit ship-to-ship transfers. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is working with allies and partners to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) by disrupting illicit ship-to-ship transfers, often near or in Chinese territorial waters, and in the Yellow Sea. North Korea is also engaged in cross-border smuggling operations and cyber-enabled theft to generate revenue, while simultaneously circumventing United Nations Security Council prohibitions on coal exports.
ㅡ The Trump Administration has pursued leader-level diplomacy with North Korea for the first time, which has highlighted unique opportunities for a brighter future for North Korea. Until North Korea clearly and unambiguously makes the strategic decision to take steps to denuclearize, the United States will continue to enforce all applicable domestic and international sanctions, and DoD will remain ready to deter, and if necessary, defeat any threats to the United States, the ROK, Japan, or our other allies and partners.
4) Prevalence of Transnational Challanges
ㅡ The Indo-Pacific region continues to experience a myriad of security challenges from a range of transnational
threats, including: terrorism; illicit arms; drug, human, and wildlife trafficking; and piracy, as well as dangerous
pathogens, weapons proliferation, and natural disasters.
Multiple terrorist organizations, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), operate in countries throughout the region. The heavily-traveled Indo-Pacific sea lanes are targets for pirates seeking to steal goods
or hold ships and crews for ransom. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing further challenges regional peace
and prosperity. A region already prone to earthquakes and volcanoes as part of the Pacific Ring of Fire, the Indo-Pacific region suffers regularly from natural disasters including monsoons, hurricanes, and floods to earthquakes and volcanic activity, as well as the negative consequences of climate change.
3. U.S. National Interests and Defense Strategy
1) U.S. National Interests (2017 National Security Strategy - Google 검색)
(1). Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life;
(2). Promote American prosperity through fair and reciprocal economic relationships to address trade imbalances;
(3). Preserve peace through strength by rebuilding our military so that it remains preeminent, and rely on allies and partners to shoulder a fair share of the burden of responsibility to protect against common threats; and,
(4). Advance American influence by competing and leading in multilateral organizations so that American interests and principles are protected.
2) U.S. National Defense Strategy (2018 NDS)
(1). Defend the homeland;
(2). Remain the preeminent military power in the world;
(3). Ensure the balances of power in key regions remain in our favor; and
(4). Advance an international order that is most conducive to our security and prosperity.
4. Sustaining U.S Influence to Achieve Regional Objectives
1) Line of Effort 1 : Preparedness
ㅡ The National Defense Strategy directs the Department to employ its resources in ways that enhance the lethality,
resilience, agility, and readiness of the Joint Force.
This resourcing must span near-term force employment activities and longer-term investments to modernize and redesign the U.S. military. The Department is developing innovative capabilities and operating concepts to address specific operational problems.
This also involves identifying new, asymmetric ways to upgrade and employ legacy systems.
Experimentation and exercises to test evolving warfighting concepts and capabilities help create a virtuous cycle
that spurs additional ideas and innovations.
Many of these experiments and exercises are being conducted alongside allies and partners to ensure we can test and improve interoperability for joint and combined operations.
ㅡ Current Posture in the Indo-Pacific
In the region, USINDOPACOM currently has more than 2,000 aircraft; 200 ships and submarines; and more than 370,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, DoD civilians, and contractors assigned within its area of responsibility.
The largest concentration of forces in the region are in Japan and the ROK. A sizable contingent of forces (more than 5,000 on a day-to-day basis) are also based in the U.S. territory of Guam,
which serves as a strategic hub supporting crucial operations and logistics for all U.S. forces operating in the Indo-Pacific region.
Other allies and partners that routinely host U.S. forces on a smaller scale include the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom through the island of Diego Garcia.
ㅡ Future Posture in the Indo-Pacific
To achieve our strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific, we seek to evolve our posture and balance key
capabilities across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania to have a more dynamic and distributed presence and
access locations across the region.
For example, as announced by Vice President Pence on November 16, 2018, the United States seeks to partner with Papua New Guinea and Australia on their joint initiative at Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island.
2) Line of Effort 2 : Partnership
ㅡ U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific is rooted in our long-standing security alliances – the bedrock
on which our strategy rests. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy,
providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.
ㅡ Expanding our interoperability with allies and partners will ensure that our respective defense enterprises can
work together effectively during day-to-day competition, crisis, and conflict.
Through focused security cooperation, informationsharing agreements, and regular exercises,
we are connecting intent, resources, and outcomes and building closer relationships between our militaries
and economies. Increasing interoperability also involves ensuring our military hardware and software are able to
integrate more easily with those of our closest allies and partners, offering financing and sales of cutting-edge
U.S. defense equipment to security partners, and opening up the aperture of U.S. professional military education to more IndoPacific military officers.
ㅡ Modernizing Aliances
Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan, New Zealand, Mongolia.....
ㅡ Republic of Korea
The United States remains steadfast in its commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK).
The U.S.ROK Alliance is the linchpin of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia, as well as the Korean Peninsula.
The Department is continuing its work with the ROK Ministry of National Defense to transition wartime operational control for Combined Forces Command (CFC) from a U.S. Commander to a ROK Commander.
To achieve this, the DoD and the ROK Ministry of National Defense are investing in critical military capabilities to ensure our combined readiness to meet any threat to the alliance.
The United States and the ROK are also working to enhance alliance capabilities in the fields of space, cyberspace, and missile defense, along with efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction.
Together, the United States and the ROK are constantly improving our ISR capacity; developing a robust, tiered BMD; fielding appropriate command and control assets; acquiring necessary inventories of critical munitions; and enhancing the tools to prevent, deter, and respond to cyber attacks.
The United States and the ROK continue combined training through command post exercises, as well as field training exercises to ensure the readiness and combat proficiency of combined forces on the Peninsula and in the region. The Department is also working to revitalize the United Nations Command, which contributes to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through oversight and maintenance of the 1953 Armistice Agreement
3) Line of Effort 3 : Promoting a Networked Region
ㅡ Shared security in the Indo-Pacific continues to rest on U.S. military presence and a growing network of alliances and close partnerships that promote interoperability and coordination.
As the Indo-Pacific changes, the United States is augmenting its bilateral relationships with trilateral and multilateral arrangements, and encouraging intra-Asian security relationships for partnerships with purpose.
As articulated in the National Defense Strategy, DoD will strengthen and evolve our alliances and partnerships into an extended network capable of deterring or decisively acting to meet the shared challenges of our time.
In the Indo-Pacific, this includes a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.
ㅡ TRILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS : ROK - Japan - U.S. / Japan - Australia - U.S / U.S - India - Japan
1) UNSCR enforcement
2) Information sharing
3) anti-submarine warfare
4) BMD
5) mine counter-measure warfare
6) HA/DR efforts
ㅡ STRENGTHENING REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS THROUGH MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT : ASEAN
ㅡ EMERGING INTRA-ASIAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS
5. Conclusion
ㅡ The United States is a Pacific nation and has a natural and enduring interest in the Indo-Pacific.
For more than 70 years the United States, along with our like-minded allies and partners,
has helped underwrite a stable security environment that allowed the people, economies,
and nations in the Indo-Pacific to rise and prosper. Our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific
encompasses values shared by our allies and partners in the region – one that emphasizes upholding
a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, transparency, and accountability
ㅡ The United States will uphold our commitments and will act to defend our interests and those of our allies and partners. At the same time, we maintain our expectation that our allies and partners will contribute their fair share to security by:
1) Resourcing and investing sufficiently for their own defense to ensure deterrence and mitigate vulnerabilities;
2) Cooperating in building partner capacity for third party partners in the region;
3) Upholding a rules-based international order (i.e., flying, sailing, and operating to uphold international laws and norms);
4) Providing access needed for contingency response and resiliency;
5) Strengthening interoperability, including information sharing, with the United States and other like-minded countries in the region; and,
6) Promoting and actively participating in region-led initiatives to uphold a free and open IndoPacific.
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