참고#1. https://www.mk.co.kr/premium/special-report/view/2020/04/28122/
참고#2. https://www.csis.org/analysis/space-threat-assessment-2020
ㅇ Introduction
ㅡ Space Threat Assessment 2020 reviews the open-source information available on the counterspace capabilities that can threaten U.S. space systems and which countries are developing such systems. The report is intended to raise awareness and understanding of the threats, debunk myths and misinformation, and highlight areas in which senior leaders and policymakers should focus their attention.
ㅡ This report focuses on five specific countries that are either avidly pursuing counterspace capabilities or that present the greatest risk to the United States' National Security: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and India. A sixth section analyzes the counterspace capabilities of select other countries, including some allies and partners of the United States, and some non-state actors. This report is not a comprehensive assessment of all known threats to U.S. space systems because much of the information on what other countries are doing to advance their counterspace systems is not publicly available. Instead, it serves as an unclassified assessment that aggregates and highlights open-source information on counterspace capabilities for policymakers and the general public.
ㅇ Types of counterspace weapons
ㅡ SPACE IS AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ENABLER of economic and military power.
ㅡ Many countries are purchasing satellites to support their own strategic military activities.
Others believe that the ability to attack space assets offers an asymmetric advantage and as a result,
are pursuing a range of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.
The United States considers unfettered ac-cess to and freedom to operate in space to be a vital interest.
Any harmful interference with or an attack upon critical components of our space ar-chitecture
that directly affects this vital U.S. interest will be met with a de-liberate response
at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing.
ㅡ Counterspace weapons vary in the types of effects they create, and the level of technological sophistication and resources required to develop and field them. They also differ in how they are employed and how difficult they are to detect and attribute
1) Kinetic physical
ㅡ weapons attemps to strike satellites or ground stations
2) Non-kinetic physical
ㅡ Lasers, High-powered microwave(HPM), Electromagnetic pulse(EMP) -> SAT, GS.
3) Electronic
ㅡ Jamming or spoofing radio frequency(RF) signals
4) Cyber
ㅡ take contorl of a satellite and damage or destroy it
5) Threat characteristics
ㅡ some types of counterspace threats are difficult to attribute or have fully reversible effects, such as mobile jammers.
ㅡ High-powered lasers, for example, are “silent” and can carry out an attack with little public awareness that anything has happened.
ㅡ Other types of counterspace weapons produce effects that make it difficult for the attacker to know if the attack was successful, and some produce collateral damage that can affect space systems other than the one being targeted.
ㅡ Conversely, counterspace weapons that have limited battle damage assessment or that risk collateral damage may be less useful to adversaries in many situations.
ㅡ Furthermore, weapons that pro-duce collateral damage in space, such as large amounts of space debris, run the risk of escalating a conflict and turning other nations against the attacker.
ㅇ China
ㅡ IN THE PAST DECADE, China has been barreling toward its lofty space goals. In the 2010s alone, China conducted over 200 successful orbital launches.12 China’s civil, military, and commercial capabilities are rapid-ly growing, and its 2020 plans show that the country aims to launch over 60 satellites into orbit via 40 launches over the coming year
ㅡ China’s civil space program is focused on its network of BeiDou position-ing, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellites, similar to the U.S. Global Posi-tioning System (GPS). China plans on launching two BeiDou satellites into geostationary orbit (GEO) in 2020 as well as further developing its Gaofen remote sensing satellite constellation. Since early 2019, Chang’e-4, the Chi-nese lunar lander mission that delivered a successful lunar rover called Yutu-2, has been conducting an exploration mission on the far side of the Moon. China plans to follow up this mission in late 2020 with Chang’e-5, a mission that aims to return samples from the Moon back to Earth for further study. To support its growing space capabilities, China has “built an expan-sive ground support infrastructure to support its growing on-orbit fleet and related functions including spacecraft and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture, launch, C2 [command and control], and data downlink.”
ㅡ China also intends to send a mission to Mars with an orbiter and probe. This mission will include science payloads and is on track for a July 2020 launch.Three different launch vehicles are also scheduled to make their first flight in 2020: the Long March-5B, the Long March-7A, and the Long March-8.
The Long March-5B will be China’s heavy-lift workhorse, supporting future explora-tion missions as well as the planned Chinese Space Station (CSS).
The first test launch of the -5B will likely take place in April 2020. If successful, it will be used to launch the first section of the modular CSS. The Long March-8 is planned to be China’s first rocket with a reusable first stage and is planned to support China’s growing com-mercial space sector.
Furthermore, “China aspires for a 2036 first human mission to the moon
ㅡ Overall, there appears to be an interest-ing shift in Chinese counterspace de-velopments in 2019. Through the open-source assessment above, it appears that China has paused, or at least slowed, de-velopment and testing of its kinetic phys-ical counterspace capabilities. This could be because its kinetic ASAT capabilities are well developed or because kinetic physical counterspace weapons are overt weapons that would likely draw a strong international condemnation if ever used. However, beginning in late December 2019 and through early January 2020, there is evidence that China’s inspector satellite, SJ-17, was moving around in GEO, possibly signaling a return to opera-tions after a hiatus of nearly a year
ㅡ China is greatly increasing its development, testing, and fielding of non-kinetic physical and electronic counterspace weapons. The operational deployment of lasers capable of dazzling or blinding U.S. satellites seems imminent, if it has not occurred already.
Furthermore, China is growing bolder with its electronic jamming and spoofing capabilities and may be using these technologies to hide illegal activities on its own coast or in the South China Sea. In 2020, it is likely that satellite jamming and spoofing capabilities will continue to be deployed and used in areas of gray zone conflict, such as the South China Sea and perhaps even to deter protests in Hong Kong.
China’s cyberattacks against space systems have either not been publicly discussed or did not occur in 2019. However, this does not mean China is incapable of using cyber means to attack vulnerable space systems or has abandoned this line of effort.
ㅇRussia
ㅡ WITH THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN 1991,Russia inherited both the majority of the former state’s vast space infrastructure and its place among the global space powers.130 Since then, Russia has maintained a leading role in the global space community by operating the third-largest number of satellites on orbit, serving as a critical partner in international human spaceflight, and managing several of the world’s busiest spaceports—all while facing an inconsistent federal budgetary environment and claims of widespread internal corruption.
By some metrics, Russia’s space activity pales in comparison to the Soviet Union, which launched more payloads to orbit than all other countries combined before its collapse.
Other measurements, however, such as launch vehicle reliability and hu-man spaceflight achievements, describe a formidable space actor with remarkable resilience in a rapidly changing space domain.
ㅡ As the only ISS partner agency with a human-rated launch vehicle, Russia is responsible for ferrying all astronauts to and from the space station using its Soyuz rocket. Since the U.S. Space Shuttle’s final flight in 2011, Russia has launched 53 foreign astronauts to the ISS, including 34 Americans.
At over $80 million per seat, carrying passengers to orbit makes up 17 percent of the Russian space agency’s annual budget, according to leaked budget documents from 2018.
For decades, NASA has had plans to develop a U.S. launch vehicle capable of transporting its astronauts to the ISS, lowering its dependence on the Russian Soyuz launch vehicle. With the first crewed flight test of the SpaceX Dragon capsule expected later this year as part of the U.S. Commercial Crew Program, the Russian space agency may soon find itself with many fewer human spaceflight customers compared to the past decade
ㅡ While the Soviet Union developed weap-ons in just two of the four counterspace categories—kinetic and non-kinetic physical weapons—Russia has invested in all four over the past 10 years. Evidence suggests that Russia is developing an air-launched direct-ascent ASAT missile, has already tested a ground-based direct-as-cent ASAT, and is reinvigorating an array of co-orbital counterspace technologies more than 50 years after the Soviet Un-ion became the first and only country to successfully destroy a target satellite using a co-orbital ASAT weapon. Russia has built off of the Soviet Union’s arsenal of non-kinetic counterspace weapons by reviving a Soviet-era air-based laser weapon and unveiling a new ground-based trailer-mounted laser weapon. In just the past few years alone, Russia has become one of the world’s greatest perpetrators of electronic counterspace warfare, jamming and spoofing PNT and communications satellite signals in con-flict zones, nearby territories, and with-in its own borders. Although difficult to verify, Russia is also almost certainly ca-pable of targeting satellites and associ-ated ground stations through vulnerable computer networks. With new weapons added to the Russian counterspace arse-nal each year since 2018, it is clear that the country has renewed its focus on developing and maintaining its ability to disrupt, degrade, or destroy adversaries’ assets on orbit
ㅇNorth Korea
ㅡ NORTH KOREA SUCCESSFULLY ORBITED ITS FIRST SATELLITEin December 2012 after three failed attempts in July 2006, April 2009, and April 2012. Its fifth attempt, in February 2016, successfully placed a second satellite in orbit.
Both successful orbital launches from North Korea have been on the Unha-3 SLV, whose militarized adaptation is likely the same vehicle outfitted with a reentry vehi-cle in place of an orbital satellite.
Like many other spacefaring nations around the globe, North Korea’s space capabilities are closely tied to its ballistic missile development
ㅡ A North Korean law journal referenced the close relationship between space capabilities and ballistic missiles, stating “it is an undeniable truth that satellites launched into orbit by many countries around the world were made possible by rocket propulsion.” While defending the country’s satel-lite launching program, the article continued to state that the main difference between a peaceful space launch and a ballistic missile is whether the launch vehicle is furnished “with a satellite or a bomb
ㅡ Although reaching orbit is a significant achievement, many experts doubt that the two successfully launched satellites perform all of the functions the North Korean government claims.
In a 2016 interview with the Associated Press, the head of the North Korean space agency stated his intent to continue launching Earth observation satellites, and his aspirations to send a mission to the moon around 2026.
He was quoted as saying, “Even though the U.S. and its allies try to block our space development, our aerospace scien-tists will conquer space and definitely plant the flag of the DPRK on the moon
ㅡ There is little indication that North Korea is making substantial efforts to build or sustain a space industrial base, but its missile program is advancing. There were 11 separate North Korean missile tests in 2019 alone, which involved as many as 20 rockets in total.
Additional satellite footage taken in early 2020 showed increased activity at a known missile launch site, possibly signaling more tests in the near future
1. Space organization and doctrine
ㅡ North Korea keeps its doctrine and op-erational concepts largely under wraps, including what is released about its coun-terspace capabilities. The absence of discussion about counterspace capabilities that could threaten the U.S. military is unusual given the aggressive rhetoric used by the regime in touting its nuclear and missile programs.
The country con-tinues to advocate internationally for its right to a sovereign space program
ㅡ When the regime has spoken about its space program at the United Nations, delegates speak of respect of international norms to maintain peaceful development and use of outer space, including the North Korean space program’s right to help the country grow economically.
In March 2009, North Korea became a signatory to two major UN space treaties: the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1974.
Four years later, in April 2013, the country’s Supreme People’s Assembly established the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA), the official North Korean space agency.
Additionally, space has often been included in five-year plans that the regime has put forward.
ㅡIn October 2017, a delegate to the United Nations was reported in state media as saying “peaceful development of outer space is actively conducted in accordance with the 2016-2020 plan for national outer space development.”
As reported, this plan included an aim to launch a ge-ostationary satellite—a much more chal-lenging feat which would require a more powerful launch vehicle.339 State media reported a successful ground test of a new launch vehicle for this purpose, but it has not noted any attempts at an actual launch.340 The regime hopes to use satel-lites to monitor crop and forestry growth as well as to improve communication capabilities.
The plan expressed a goal to field a satellite communication system by 2019, though there is no indication that goal was achieved.
2. Counterspace Weapons
1) Kinetic physical
ㅡ Current space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles demonstrated by North Korea could serve as the basis for a kinetic ASAT capability, but many technological hurdles remain. To date, North Korea has not tested, or indicated that it is attempting to develop, a direct-ascent or co-orbital ASAT capability.
It is unlikely that North Korea could quickly gain the technology for an effective direct-ascent or co-orbital ASAT weapon, as it has only succeeded in placing two satellites into orbit, the operation of which are not confirmed outside state media. This additional capability would also require onboard sensors (e.g., optical, infrared, radar) and a guidance system to steer the weapon into a target satellite
ㅡ It is conceivable that North Korea could field a crude direct-ascent ASAT capability in the near term in the form of an adapt-ed ballistic missile. This would be possible with the launch of an unguided warhead set to detonate in the vicinity of a target satellite. Rather than directly strike a satellite, it could create a debris field that would complicate future operations for satellites in a similar orbit. For example, the North Korean No Dong-1 medium-range ballistic missile would likely be able to carry a 1200 kg payload to a maximum altitude of 600 to 750 km—well within the LEO regime.343Missiles launched from North Korean terri-tory could more easily be used in a conven-tional attack on nearby ground stations that support satellite operations, such as the U.S.-operated GPS monitoring station in South Korea and other ground stations as far away as Guam
2) Non-kinetic physical
ㅡ The technology necessary to develop directed energy weapons, such as lasers that are able to dazzle or blind the sensors on satellites, requires a level of sophistication that North Korea likely does not possess.
It is possible, however, that North Korea could develop a crude EMP weapon for use against space assets.
In 2017, North Korea successfully tested a hydrogen bomb un-derground, a claim that was confirmed by South Korea and Japan. Officials from Pyongyang released a photo of the hydrogen bomb and asserted that the bomb is able to fit on an ICBM.
Kim Jong-un has called for further improvements in nuclear bombs similar to this test in the “Songun” spirit, which places the military first. In January 2020, KCNA reported that Kim Jong-un declared the world would soon see a new strategic weapon, adding that there will never be denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.
ㅡ A nuclear weapon on a long range missile would theoretically give North Korea the capability to create a high-altitude EMP effect. In 2018, The Daily NK—a South Korean news site—obtained North Ko-rean internal propaganda documents aimed to inform citizens that the country has the capability to damage enemies’ military and civilian electronic systems beyond repair as a result of a nuclear EMP attack.
North Korea is not a signatory of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the country has not tested a nuclear weapon at high altitudes
3) Electronics
ㅡ North Korea has acquired and is constant-ly using electronic forms of attack against varying space systems.
In 2010, South Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae-young said in a speech to parliament that “North Korea has imported vehicle-mountable devices capable of jamming GPS signals from Russia.” These downlink jamming systems reportedly have an effective ra-dius of 50 to 100 km. North Korea began using this jamming equipment against South Korea in August 2010, but South Korean forces could not pinpoint the location of the jammers at that time because the jamming lasted just 10 minutes in each instance
ㅡ In the decade since, North Korea has repeatedly used its GPS jamming capabilities against South Korea.
More GPS jamming occurred in December 2010 and again in March 2011, which coincided with a U.S.-South Korean military exercise. Jamming occurred again in April 2012, disrupting air traffic at Incheon and Gimpo international airports, forcing flights to use alternative navigation systems.
In March and April 2016, over 250 South Korean fishing boats lost access to GPS, forcing them to return to shore.
A few days later, South Korea complained to the UN Security Council that North Korea was jamming GPS signals across the border, with the jamming coming from five areas in North Korea: Pyong-yang, Kaesong, Haeju, Yonan county, and Mount Kumgang.
Documents state that in 2016, 2,143 aircraft disclosed GPS inter-ference, likely due to North Korean jamming operations
ㅡThe South Korean Defense Ministry has said it believes the jamming attacks originate from “a regiment-sized electronic warfare unit near the North Korean capital Pyongyang, and battalion-sized units closer to the inter-Korean border.”
The jammers are mounted on mobile platforms and are operated intermittently, which could be difficult to locate and neutralize in a conflict. North Korea appears to be gaining operational experience using these systems in peacetime. Because the GPS jammers were acquired from Russia, it is possible that North Korea could also have acquired other types of jamming capabilities that can target different satellite systems, such as uplink jammers that can disrupt military satellite communications.
4) Cyber
ㅡ Under the Kim Jong-un regime, North Korea has used its cyber forces frequently, first launching attacks on South Korea and the United States, then branching out to others. According to CrowdStrike, North Korean hackers have the second-fastest breakout time (the time need-ed for hackers to achieve their objectives in an attack) of any hacking organization in the world, behind Russia. North Korea’s malicious cyber activity tends to focus on financial targets or inter-Korea issues. A majority of the cyberattacks stemming from North Korea are “linked to currency generation and economy-bolstering efforts for the Kim regime.
ㅡ Experts believe there are around 6,000 - 7,500 military personnel conducting cyber warfare for the North Korean state. Cybersecurity defector and founder of North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity, Kim Hueng-kwang, said most cyber operations in the country are organized in a unit directly under North Korea’s main overseas intelligence agency, the Recon-naissance General Bureau (RGB).
He emphasized that North Korea was “in-spired by the Chinese cyberwar units and learned from them.”
According to Kim, members of an elite North Korean hacking group go on covert missions overseas, generally to places with better internet than the notoriously shielded country, to lower the risk of being caught.
South Korea’s vice foreign minister confirmed this report, telling Reuters that North Korea has been carrying out cyberattacks by placing individuals in scattered foreign countries in an attempt to disguise the origin of the attacks.
ㅡ A leaked report sent to the UN Security Council’s North Korea sanctions commit-tee stated that through 35 separate cyber-attacks, North Korea has stolen over $2 billion, which has likely been used to fund weapons development.
Subsequently, the U.S. Department of the Treasury an-nounced sanctions for three state-spon-sored cyber groups from the country, naming them responsible for malicious cyber activity on critical infrastructure
ㅡ North Korean hackers have also been tied to a nuclear power plant in India and possibly the Indian Space Research Organi-zation during its Chandrayaan-2 mission, although Indian space authorities deny they were compromised.
They are also suspected to have hacked an Israeli aero-space and defense company. Given its demonstrated cyber capabilities, it is con-ceivable that North Korea could initiate a cyberattack against U.S. space systems or ground stations, although there is no publicly available information to suggest this has happened to date
3. Summary
ㅡ North Korea has demonstrated growing capabilities in two counterspace weapons categories: electronic and cyber. It is also developing some of the necessary tech-nologies to field a non-kinetic physical nu-clear EMP counterspace weapon through its nuclear program, but this does not appear to be the intent of those activities.
ㅡAlthough North Korea has demonstrated its dedication to increasing the range of its ICBM-class missiles, its limited number of successful orbital launches suggest that the country is far from developing the capabilities needed to pose a significant kinetic physical threat to foreign satellite systems.
The only significant risk of non-kinetic physical attack from North Korea is high altitude nuclear detonation, a devastating, irreversible counterspace attack that would indiscriminately affect systems in the target satellite’s orbital re-gime. Importantly, North Korea is improv-ing its electronic warfare capabilities, as demonstrated in continued GPS jamming and spoofing operations, and is continu-ing to use cyberattacks against a variety of targets worldwide
ㅇ 약어 정리
1) HPM - High-Powered Microwave
2) HPL - Higi-Powered Laser
3) RPO - Rendezvous and Proximity Operations
4) ADR - Active Debris Removal
5) OOS - On-orbit satellite servicing
6) ASAT - Anti-SATellite (Weapons)
7) SLV - Space Launch Vehicle
8) DPRK - Democratic People's Republic of Korea
9) TEL - Transporter Erector-Launcher
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