Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the N.D.S

출처#1. mwi.usma.edu/the-defense-department-just-published-a-summary-of-the-national-defense-strategys-irregular-warfare-annex-heres-why-its-so-significant/

The Defense Department Just Published a Summary of the National Defense Strategy’s Irregular Warfare Annex. Here’s Why It’

출처#2. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF

---

ㅇ Summary of I.R(Irregular Warfare) Annext to the N.D.S(National Defense Strategy)

ㅇ Foreword

ㅡ Irregular warfare is an enduring, economical contribution to America’s national security, and will remain an essential core competency of the U.S. Department of Defense.

 

ㅡ Consequently, the Department of Defense will:

(1) make permanent the mindset and capabilities necessary to succeed in its current irregular warfare mission sets;

(2) leverage all irregular capabilities in our arsenal, including the unique abilities of our interagency and foreign partners, to compete against revisionist powers and violent extremist organizations alike.

This approach does not require significant new resources to meet our strategic vision; it requires new ideas and new means of employing existing capabilities.

 

ㅡ We must not — and will not — repeat the “boom and bust” cycle that has left the United States underprepared for irregular warfare in both Great Power Competition and conflict.

Americans expect their military to do more than react to crises, they expect us to compete and maintain our advantages. 

ㅇ Strategic environment

1) Irregular Warfare : An Enduring Mission and Core competency 

 

ㅡ It includes the specific missions of unconventional warfare (UW), stabilization, foreign internal defense (FID), counterterrorism (CT), and counterinsurgency (COIN).

Related activities such as military information support operations, cyberspace operations, countering threat networks, counter-threat finance, civil-military operations, and security cooperation also shape the information environment and other population-focused arenas of competition and conflict.

 

ㅡ China, Russia, and Iran are willing practitioners of campaigns of disinformation, deception, sabotage, and economic coercion, as well as proxy, guerrilla, and covert operations. 

This increasingly complex security environment suggests the need for a revised understanding of IW to account for its role as a component of great power competition

 

ㅡ We must creatively mix our traditional combat power with proactive, dynamic, and unorthodox approaches to IW that can shape, prevent, and prevail against our nation’s adversaries and maintain favorable regional balances of power alongside our key partners and allies. 

 

2) Problem Statement

 

ㅡ IW is a persistent and enduring operational reality employed by non-state actors and increasingly by state actors in competition with the United States

 

3) Central Idea

 

ㅡ The Department must institutionalize irregular warfare as a core competency for both conventional and special operations forces, sustaining the ability to impose costs and create dilemmas for our adversaries across the full spectrum of competition and conflict.

 

ㅡ To accomplish this vision, the Department will:

› Break the reactive cycle of investment in IW capabilities by institutionalizing lessons learned from past conflicts, and preserving a baseline of IW-focused expertise and capabilities;

› Sustain IW as a core competency for the entire Joint Force, not just Special Operations Forces;

› Ensure widespread understanding and sufficient expertise in IW;

› Ensure its approach to IW becomes more agile and cost-informed by developing and employing resource-sustainable IW capabilities;

› Seize the initiative and use IW capabilities proactively to expand the competitive space, defeat our adversaries’ competitive strategies, and prepare for an escalation to conflict, if required; and

› Organize to foster and sustain unified action in IW with interagency partners as well as key allies and partners.

 

 

ㅇ Recent Lessens guide our approach

1) We remain underprepared for I.W.

2) Most military capabilities can be applied in an Irregular context

ㅡ Conventional forces have supported or led counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan; stabilization missions in Bosnia and Somalia; and other irregular campaigns.

Even when special operations forces (SOF) have taken the lead in unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense missions, they are heavily enabled by conventional forces.

As we shift towards great power competition, our conventional forces must not lose the ability to wage irregular war.

3) Conventional overmatch encourage adversaries to pursue indirect approaches

4) Irregular war requires Unified action

5) Recent operations set a standar for an enduring approach

 

 

ㅇ IRREGULAR WARFARE STRATEGIC APPROACH

1) Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare

ㅡ We will prioritize investments in human capital as the primary competitive advantage in IW over our adversaries.

Military officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians must receive continuous access to IW-related training, doctrine, and education in order to build shared understanding

 

2) Operationalizing Irregular Warfare

ㅡ We will seize the initiative and execute proactive, enduring campaigns employing IW capabilities to expand the competitive space, shape the environment, and prepare for escalation to conflict, if required.